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In this paper w e present a model that studies firm  mergers in a spatial 
setting.  A new model is formulated that addresses the issue of finding 
the number of branches that have to be eliminated by a firm after 
merging with another one, in order to maximize profits.  The model is 
then applied to an example of bank mergers in the city of Barcelona.  
Finally, a variant of the formulation  that introduces competition  is 
presented together with some conclusions. 
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1. Introduction 
A major reason why companies decide to expand geographically via a merger relates to 
the exploitation of potential cost and revenue synergies from merging. Indeed, in recent 
years, a merger wave among firms has occurred, including some mega mergers among 
large firms, driven by the desire to achieve greater cost and revenue synergies.  Several 
economic sectors are especially sensitive to mergers. 
The banking sector, among others, has been experiencing worldwide in the past decades 
big mergers among banks. A reason frequently given for bank mergers is the potential 
cost synergies that may exist. For example, in 1996, Chase Manhattan and Chemical 
Bank merged, creating the (then) largest banking organization in the United States with 
assets of $300 billion. Annual cost savings f rom the merger were estimated at $1.5 
billion, to be achieved by consolidating certain operations and eliminating redundant 
costs, including the elimination of some 12,000 positions from a combined staff of 
75,000 located in 39 states and 51 countries. The $30 billion merger of BancOne and 
First Chicago in 1998 was estimated to produce $930 million in cost savings and $275 
million in additional revenue resulting from synergies in their credit card and retail and 
commercial banking business. Similarly, Milwaukee-based Firstar’s $18.7 billion 
acquisition of Minneapolis-based U.S. Bancorp in late 2000 was expected to reduce 
combined expenses by $206 million per year (an amount equivalent to 5 percent of the 
combined bank’s expenses prior to the acquisition) and Boston-based FleetFinancial’s 
purchase of New Jersey’s Summit Bancorp for $7 billion in 2001 was estimated to save 
as much as $275 million in annual expenses (or about 30 percent of the combined banks 
expenses). In both cases, cost savings were estimated to come through the closing of 
overlapping branches and laying off personnel. Finally, in 2001 First Union acquired 
Wachovia for $14.6 billion. The merger of these two North Carolina banks was   3
expected to reduce annual expenses by $890 million through the consolidation of 250 to 
300 branches and cutting of some 7,000 jobs.   In Europe, after the merger of Bank 
Austria and Creditanstalt AG in Austria, 70 of the 470 bank branches of the combined 
firm were closed in 2002.  
Several studies have analyzed the economic and financial consequences of bank 
mergers.   Rhoades (1998) looked at nine large bank mergers with substantial market 
overlap in the early 1990s. He found that all produced significant cost cutting in line 
with the pre-merger projections due to branch reductions. Piloff (1996) looked at 48 
bank mergers in the 1980s, relating announcement period abnormal returns to 
accounting based performance measures. He found higher abnormal returns that offer 
the greatest potential for cost reductions (measured by  geographic overlap and pre-
merger cost measures). Piloff also found that industry-adjusted profitability of the 
merged banks does not change, that total expenses to assets increases, and that revenues 
rise in the five year period around the merger. Houston, et al. (2001) looked at analysts' 
estimates of projected cost savings and revenue enhancements associated with bank 
mergers. They found that analysts’ estimates of increases in combined bank value 
associated with a merger are due mainly to estimated costs savings rather than projected 
revenue enhancements. Finally, Avery, et al. (1999) looked at mergers during the period 
1975 through 1998 involving banks with significant geographic overlap (measured by 
the number of branches in a ZIP code per capita). They found that these mergers 
resulted in a significant decrease in branches per capita.  
In this paper we present a model that addresses the issue of mergers in a spatial setting.  
In the next section a new model is formulated that addresses the issue of finding the 
number of branches that have to be eliminated by a firm after merging with another one, 
in order to maximize revenues.  The model then is applied to an example in the city of   4
Barcelona.  Finally, a variant of the formulation is presented together  with some 
conclusions. 
 
2. The Merger Delocation  Model  
Suppose a region where several firms are spatially competing f or customers.  Let us 
consider that this region  is represented by discrete points  (nodes)  in a connected 
network.   Each node has a parameter that can represent population or local demand for 
the product/service offered in the region.  Several firms are operating in that market 
with competition “a la Hotelling”, that is, the demand is captured by the closest outlet, 
regardless of ownership.  The product sold is homogeneous across firms.  
There are two players, conceptually, each one of them  with a set of stores distributed 
across the landscape.  The players are firm A and firm B , where A is considering 
merging with B.  The stores of each firm are considered all of the same type.  Their 
market regions overlap in some areas and not in other areas. 
Firm A is trying to become a more dominant player and has enough resources to merge 
with B, which would then convert to A type stores with A’s branded merchandise or 
maybe under a new brand name, but offering the same products and services as before.  
The bargain between A and B to merge will depend not only on what A and B can 
afford but also on the revenue and return potential that will accrue to A and B from 
merging into a single firm.  The two players do have some overlap so that some stores 
of A or B type will likely be closed if A merges with B.  The analysis we are proposing 
would determine the maximum amount that A should pay for B’s stores.   
Let’s define the following parameters and variables:  
JA = set of store sites for A 
JB = set of store sites for B 
J = JA U JB 
i, I = Index and set of demand areas that A and B currently serve   5
ai = demand at i, the demand that would be served if the store were at i 
dij = distance between demand area i and store j 
uij = the demand at i that will seek service at j if there is no intervening store 
vi = net revenue derived from a unit of demand (demand may have units of trips/year 
and vi may have units of €/trip).  Net revenue is income less the cost of goods 
Ni = {j, such that any flow from i to j will still be positive} 
fj = Cost to operate store j per year.  This includes staffing, utilities, taxes, debt services, 
leasing, if store is leased, and if it is a B type store the annualized cost of converting the 
store to an A type. 
xij = 1, if demand at i is assigned to a store at j; 0, otherwise 
yj = 1, if store j is retained open; 0, otherwise 
 
The demand function uij deserves some comments.  For A’s old customers the function 
is likely to decline rapidly when the distance between area i and store j increases. We 
will consider uij as a lineal function (see Figure 1). If we suppose that a store is at area i, 
then the distance dij will be 0 and A customers do not need to travel further to A’s 
closest competitor.  A similar pattern might be observed for B’s former customers. 
 
 


















The set Ni contains all the stores that are located close to demand node i and that have a 
positive flow, that is, uij > 0. 
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The first set of constraints (equation 2) forces each demand node to be assigned to only 
one store with positive flow.  The third set of constraints allows a facility to be assigned 
to a demand node only if it remains open, that is, when the model is solved, yj = 1 
means that a store previously open remains open.  If   yj = 0, a store previously open 
now closes and all its associated costs exit the profit equation.  The closest store could 
be an A type store or a B type store.  Observe that the set of constraints is very similar 
to one corresponding to the p-median model.  The only difference is that in the p-
median constraint set includes a constraint that fixes the number of facilities to be 
located.  In the merger model, the analysis is not only determining profit associated with 
the acquisition but also which stores are likely to be closed.  The problem is not very 
large because the stores do not reach very far, in the sense that customers are not willing 
to or are not required to travel far because competition from players C.  The problem 
resembles, but is far smaller than, the Maximum Profit Plant Location Problem (Jucker 
and Carlson 1976, ReVelle and Laporte 1997).  The number that comes from this 
analysis is the profit from the combined system of stores.    
If we assume that instead of a merger, Firm A is seeking to purchase all Firm B outlets, 
the profit from the system of A’s stores is subtracted from the number giving the profit 
on the purchase.  This last number, call it P, when divided by the acquisition cost D may 
be required to be at least alpha: 
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giving us an upper bound on the amount that A might offer for B stores. 
Ni contains the set of stores j that make function uij positive. The maximum distance 
(dmax) that make function uij = 0 is a parameter of the problem. If we choose a store j, 
which is not at Ni, function  uij will take negative values. This mean that the cost to 
operate store j at area i is bigger than the net revenue that will apport. 
As we will see in the next section of the paper, the number of stores of firm A or B that 
remain open which maximizes function Z depends on dmax. The larger the value of dmax 
the smaller is the number of stores that will remain open after solving the merger 
problem. 
 
3.  A Theoretical Application 
The integer linear model presented was solved using LINGO. To get some results and 
prove its utility we have considered the cost to operate store j per year the same for all 
stores. 
The Swain’s 55-node region has been used (see Appendix A.1), and we have considered 
the same number of areas (i) and stores (j). In other words, we have supposed that every 
area has a store (#I = #J = 55). Therefore, we are going to optimize the number of stores 
that maximize Z. It is necessary to remember that the model we are studying, to 
maximize Z, close stores and leave in the same place stores which remain open, but 
does not move stores from an area to another, because it uses the stores of the firms A 
and B that were open before the merger.  In other words, no re-location is allowed. 
For each node, the associated demand function is lineal and decreases when distance 
increases. The parameter uij is a function of dij, i.e., uij = uij(dij). When the distance is   8
equal to zero the utility function is equal to ai, and when the distance dij is equal to dmax 
(dij = dmax) then uij is zero.  The demand function is defined as follows: 
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To compare the results we will obtain in function of dmax, we have considered three 
different values for dmax, the next table contains the value of the objective function and 
the number of stores that stay open in order to maximize the profits in the region we are 
interested in. 
Maximum distance Objective function Number of outlets
200 265.551,60 22
300 288.585,20 11
400 306.815,50 8  
As we can see in the table when distance increases, the objective function increases and 
the number of stores which remain open, decreases. 
In this example, the value of the fixed cost fj is set arbitrarily, since the relevant issue is 
that the value of the objective function increases as the maximum distance increases. 
This happens because the set Ni gets larger as the distance increases, and there are more 
summands in the first part of Z that make it increase. 
The number of stores decreases when distance increases. This happens because the set 
Ni,  that makes t he utility function positive, increases with the maximum distance.   9
Remember that the maximum distance makes utility function zero, and stores that are in 
the set Ni have a positive utility function for the area i. 
 
4. A Real Application 
In this section, we will consider the city of Barcelona, divided in 321 areas. We will 
study the merger between two existing savings banks, Caixa de Girona and Caixa de 
Manlleu. 
We have chosen these two banks because they both have a similar number of branch 
offices in the metropolitan area of Barcelona. Caixa de Girona is larger than the other 
savings bank; therefore we will assume that the first one wants to acquire the second 
one. 
The offices of these two banks are in general, as many banks in big cities, concentrated 
in the CBD as shown in Figure 1. Before solving optimally the model, our logic says 
that it is probable that after the merger some offices located in the center will close and 
the ones in the city boundaries will remain open. 
The distance between the centroïds of the areas is measured in minutes. In the previous 
section the distance matrix was measured in meters, and we used the maximum 
distance, dmax, as the value that made the utility function uij = 0. Now that the same 
matrix is measured in minutes, we have to use the maximum time, tmax. This is the 
maximum time we consider a person is willing to walk to go from the area s/he lives to 
a bank office. We have 321 areas, #I = 321, and since each saving bank considered has 
ten offices in Barcelona, then #J = 20. We have chosen random values for the cost to 
operate store j per year, fj, , so the value of the objective function is not representative in 
monetary terms. 
   10
 
 





As we did in the past section, we have chosen three different values for tmax to compare 
the results of the model.  
Next table shows the results: 
Maximum time Objective function Number of outlets
10 42.481,68 7
20 90.686,50 6
30 108.725,20 4  
As occurred in section 3, objective function increases with the distance, and the number 
of stores that remain open decreases. 
Figure 3 shows the position of stores remaining opened with different maximum times.   11
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We can see in the different cases, as we have supposed, that many branch offices, which 
where in the center, have been closed, while the ones sited around the city remain open. 
If we compare the distribution of areas between tmax = 10 and tmax = 20, we can see that 
they are very similar. The reason is that in the first case only one more office is opened 
than in the second case. The areas that were assigned to the office that was closed in the 
second case, have almost all been assigned to the same office when tmax = 20. 
   12
5. Model extensions 
So far, in the model presented we have assumed that there are no competitors other than 
both Firms A and B.  Suppose now that there are three players, each one of them with a 
set of stores distributed across the landscape.  The players are firm A, firm B and firm 
C, where A is considering to merge with B. Firm C is thought of all other firms 
operating in that market with their stores.  The stores of all firms are considered all of 
the same type.  Their market areas overlap in some areas and not in other areas. 
The issue of competition from C suggests the possibility of a second model that uses the 
notion of “capture” (ReVelle, 1986, Serra and ReVelle 1994).  For simplicity, we set an 
initial threshold for the problem of Si, the distance from i to the nearest type C store, the 
blend of competitors who remain on the landscape after the acquisition of B and A.  The 
utilization of one of the outlets of A or B by customers at i would be expected to fall 
rather steeply.  If the A or B outlet that remains on the landscape is further from i than 
Si, the distance or time to the nearest competitor C, then costumers of firms A or B will 
choose outlets from firm C.  That is, the assumption on consumer choice is a sensitivity 
to time or distance rather than any distinction of product or service.  If competitors’ 
outlets are considered (Firm C), the demand function for the merging firms is given by 
Figure 4. 
 
We again use the i and j notation for this capture model, but replace uij with ai so long 
as dij < Si (ignoring ties).  We still use yj as the 0-1 siting variable but Qi replaces Ni, 
where Qi = {j / d ij < S i}.  We define wi = 1 if the demand at i is captured, and 0 
otherwise.  That is, Qi consists on those j in JA U JB that are closer to i than Si.  Demand 
at i is fully captured if one of these j has an outlet.  The problem is to   13
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As we can see, both models are very similar. The second model  has a simpler 
formulation. When we use the first model, we only take into account the firms that are 
doing the merger, but not in other firms. However, when we use the second model, we 
study the position of competitor firms to remove outlets.  A similar model has been 
studied by Murray, ReVelle and Serra (2005) for the public sector. 
 



















In this paper, a new location model has been presented. This model chooses outlets to 
be removed in order to maximize total revenue in the merger. The model finds the 
number of outlets and their locations that have to be closed to maximize Z. In the real 
example, we have studied the location of branch offices from two different bancs sited 
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the number of outlets before the merger depends on a parameter that is related with the 
maximum time needed to go from an area to an outlet. We have seen that as the 
maximum time increases, the number of stores that remains open decreases. 
We have studied the merger between firms, something every day more common in 
market. In our model, we are using outlets that were opened before the merger to make 
a new distribution. This implies that areas that were far from outlets of both firms 
before the merger, still remain far after it, since no new locations are found.  
We have supposed from the beginning the assumption on consumer choice is based on 
time or distance rather than any distinction of product or service.  These models can be 
modified by introducing consumer-choice attributes other than distances or travel times, 
such as quality of service, as studied by Serra et al. (1999) and Colomé and Serra 
(2001), or the introduction of price decisions together with location decisions (see, for 
example, Serra and ReVelle 1999).   15
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Appendix A.1: 55-node network data 
NODE  POPN  COORD X  COORD Y  NODE  POPN  COORD X  COORD Y 
1  710  32  31  29  60  19  38 
2  620  29  32  30  60  27  41 
3  560  27  36  31  60  21  35 
4  390  29  29  32  50  32  45 
5  350  32  29  33  50  27  45 
6  210  26  25  34  50  32  38 
7  200  24  33  35  50  8  22 
8  190  30  35  36  50  15  25 
9  170  29  27  37  50  35  16 
10  170  29  21  38  40  36  47 
11  160  33  28  39  40  46  51 
12  150  17  53  40  40  50  40 
13  140  34  30  41  40  23  22 
14  120  25  60  42  40  27  30 
15  120  21  28  43  40  38  39 
16  110  30  51  44  40  36  32 
17  100  19  47  45  30  32  41 
18  100  17  33  46  30  42  36 
19  90  22  40  47  30  36  26 
20  90  25  14  48  30  15  19 
21  90  29  12  49  30  19  14 
22  80  24  48  50  30  45  19 
23  80  17  42  51  30  27  5 
24  80  6  26  52  20  52  24 
25  80  19  21  53  20  40  22 
26  70  10  32  54  20  40  52 
27  60  34  56  55  20  42  42 
28  60  12  47         
 
 